Title

Government cyber breach shows need for convergence

Authors

Charles Suslowicz, United States Military AcademyFollow
Jan Kallberg, Army Cyber InstituteFollow
Todd Arnold, Army Cyber InstituteFollow

Document Type

Editorial

USMA Research Unit Affiliation

Army Cyber Institute

Publication Date

12-28-2020

Abstract

The SolarWinds breach points out the importance of having both offensive and defensive cyber force experience.

The breach is an ongoing investigation, and we will not comment on the investigation. Still, in general terms, we want to point out the exploitable weaknesses in creating two silos — OCO and DCO.

The separation of OCO and DCO, through the specialization of formations and leadership, undermines broader understanding and value of threat intelligence. The growing demarcation between OCO and DCO also have operative and tactical implications. The Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept emphasizes the competitive advantages that the Army — and greater Department of Defense — can bring to bear by leveraging the unique and complementary capabilities of each service.

It requires that leaders understand the capabilities their organization can bring to bear in order to achieve the maximum effect from the available resources. Cyber leaders must have exposure to a depth and the breadth of their chosen domain to contribute to MDO.

Unfortunately, within the Army’s operational cyber forces, there is a tendency to designate officers as either offensive cyber operations (OCO) or defensive cyber operations (DCO) specialists. The shortsighted nature of this categorization is detrimental to the Army’s efforts in cyberspace and stymies the development of the cyber force, affecting all soldiers.

The Army will suffer in its planning and ability to operationally contribute to MDO from a siloed officer corps unexposed to the domain’s inherent flexibility.

Web Link

https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/12/28/government-cyber-breach-shows-need-for-convergence/