Title

"Russian Society and Foreign Policy: Mass and Elite Orientations After Crimea"

Contributing USMA Research Unit(s)

Social Sciences

Publication Date

3-15-2019

Publication Title

Problems of Post-Communism

Document Type

Article

Abstract

Most Russians applaud the official narrative that Russia has re-emerged as a great power under Vladimir Putin, particularly with the annexation of Crimea, and also agree with the claims of the Russian state that America is an unfriendly power. Yet they increasingly disagree with the assertions of the Kremlin that the United States is a looming external danger and a subversive force in Russian domestic politics. In line with these opinions, many Russians are unwilling to bear the economic burden of an escalating confrontation with the West, demonstrating the initially limited and now waning political significance of the “Crimea euphoria” (or “Crimea effect”) and the “rally ‘round the flag” phenomena generated by the annexation of 2014 and ensuing tensions with the West.

Russian elites often differ from the general public in their stronger backing for a more assertive foreign posture. Nevertheless, such preferences are often moderated by a preoccupation with socio-economic problems at home and by the apprehension that Russia will neglect domestic modernization indefinitely if its foreign policy is confrontational. Like Russian mass publics, Russian elites often view the external environment as dangerous, a perception that is cultivated by the Kremlin to help produce patriotic “rally” sentiments. Yet this “rally” effect is dulled by the widespread belief among both elites and masses that the greatest threats to Russia are rooted in its social and economic underdevelopment.

Russian society often finds domestic problems much more worrisome than U.S. military power or a “color revolution” fomented by the West, both of which the Kremlin has framed as important threats in its efforts to mobilize domestic supporters and isolate opponents. Drawing extensively on opinion surveys in Russia, the paper concludes that a majority of Russians are likely to believe that the Kremlin should not emphasize costly policies intended to counter U.S. military power or other potential American threats.

First Page

Introduction With the persistence of strained relations between Russia and the United States, observers often fear the advent of a new Cold War. While the determinants and goals of Russia’s foreign policy toward the West and particularly the United States are subject to debate, experts often assume that Russian society will fully support the Kremlin in a protracted confrontation. Some Western analysts offer the provocative argument that Russia’s mass publics and elites hold “entrenched revanchist” views about the American-led West which will ensure the survival of Russian hostility toward the United States after Vladimir Putin has left the political stage.1 Yet surveys of mass and elite opinion and other materials point to a more complex assessment: that most of Russia’s general public as well as broad segments of its elites are concerned over the costs of confrontation with the West and want the government to focus on social and economic problems at home. Most Russians applaud the official narrative that Russia has re-emerged as a great power under Vladimir Putin, particularly with the annexation of Crimea, and also agree with the claims of the Russian state that America is an unfriendly power. Yet they increasingly disagree with the assertions of the Kremlin that the United States is a looming external danger and a subversive force in Russian domestic politics. In line with these opinions, many Russians are unwilling to bear the economic burden of an escalating confrontation with the West, demonstrating the limited political significance of the “Crimea euphoria” (or “Crimea effect”) produced by the annexation as well as the “rally ‘round the flag” phenomenon generated by ensuing tensions with the West. The “Crimea effect” strengthened Putin’s authority by some measures but was less successful in providing durable support for Russia’s socio-economic and political institutions and policies. Belief among Russians that the country was headed in the right direction increased from 40% in November 2013 to 64% in August 2014 (five months after the annexation of Crimea), but then dropped to 46% by June 2018.2 Even Putin’s approval numbers have suffered significant decline, due in part to an unpopular government proposal in mid-2018 to raise the retirement age.3 Although a modest majority of Russians (54% in October 2018) still approve “on the whole” the Kremlin’s foreign policy,4 they are increasingly preoccupied with problems at home. Survey data reveal relatively weak approval among the public for a forceful external posture, including intervention in the “near abroad” to check American power or protect Russian-speakers from perceived discrimination. Similarly, a large majority of Russians do not favor the creation of an imperium reminiscent of the Soviet Union or tsarist Russia.

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